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Labor and Employment

by W. Melvin Haas, III*
William M. Clifton, III**
and
W. Jonathan Martin, II**
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys recent developments in the state statutory and
common law that affect labor and employment relations of Georgia
employers. Accordingly, it surveys published decisions from the Georgia
Supreme Court and Georgia Court of Appeals from June 1, 2002 to May
31, 2003. This Article also includes highlights of certain revisions to the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.").1

* Managing Member in the firm of Constangy, Brooks & Smith, LLC, Macon, Georgia.
Emory University (B.A., 1968); University of Alabama (J.D., 1971). Chapter Editor, THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAw (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 4th ed. 2001). Member, State Bars
of Georgia and Alabama.
** Member in the firm of Constangy, Brooks & Smith, LLC, Macon, Georgia.
Oglethorpe University (B.A., magna cum laude, 1988); Georgia State University (M.A.,
1990); Columbia University (J.D., 1993). Member, Columbia Journal of Environmental
Law (1992-1993). Law Clerk to the Honorable Duross Fitzpatrick, United States District
Court Judge for the Middle District of Georgia (1993-1995). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of Constangy, Brooks & Smith, LLC, Macon, Georgia.
University of Georgia (B.B.A., cum laude, 1991); Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer
University (J.D., magna cum laude, 1994). Member, Mercer Law Review (1992-1993);
Administrative Editor (1993-1994). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
The authors would like to thank Chris Hudson for his outstanding work in helping with
the research and writing of this Article. The authors would also like to recognize the
efforts of Robert Hughes, whose hard work in preparation for this Article is also greatly
appreciated.
1. Attorneys practicing labor and employment law have a multitude of reference
sources for recent developments in federal legislation and case law. See Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA); THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 4th ed. 2001); BARBARA
LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw (Paul W. Cane, Jr. et
al. eds., 3d ed. & Supps. 1996-2002). Accordingly, the purpose of this Article is not to
cover the latest developments under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
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RECENT LEGISLATION

A.

Employment Security
Although Georgia's Employment Security Law2 is a product of 1930's
"New Deal" social legislation, its "declaration of state public policy" has
remained unaltered despite numerous revisions:4 "[The public good and
general welfare of the citizens of this state require[d] ... the compulsory
setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of
persons unemployed through no fault of their own."5
Without regard to the general assembly's changes to the "Workers'
Compensation" section 6 of the Georgia Labor and Industrial Relations
Code ("the Code"),7 the general assembly enacted several amendments
to Georgia's Employment Security Law that became effective during the
survey period.' The most notable amendment expands the disqualifica-

§§ 2000a-2000h-6), the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19), the National Labor
Relations Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-34), or the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-2213). Rather, this
Article is intended only to cover legislative and judicial developments arising under
Georgia state law during the survey period.
2. O.C.G.A. § 34-1-1 (1998).
3. JAMES W. WIMBERLY, JR., GEORGIA EMPLOYMENT LAw 227 (3d ed. 2000 & Supp.
2002).
4. Id. at 227.
5. Id. at 227-28 (citing 1937 Ga. Laws 806, 807).
6. Recent developments in workers' compensation law are discussed in H. Michael
Bagley et al., Workers' Compensation Law, 55 MERCER L. REv. 481 (2003).
7. O.C.G.A. §§ 34-1-1 to 34-14-2 (1998 & Supp. 2003).
8. Two enactments of the general assembly regarding employment security became
effective during the survey period. 2002 Ga. Laws 1119-24; Ga. S. Bill 167, Reg. Sess.
(2003). However, given the relative complexity of the employment security code, the
concomitant regulatory framework, and its general inapplicability to the average
practitioner, we have chosen to omit a comprehensive analysis of the legislation.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the "Employment Security and Enhancement Act of
2002," effective July 1, 2002, amended the "Employment Security Law," inter alia, by
creating a temporary alternative base period, applicable to certain individuals and
calculated using "the first four of the last five calendar quarters completed immediately
preceding the first day of [the] individual's benefit year," § 2, 2002 Ga. Laws at 1120
(amending O.C.G.A. § 34-8-21 (1998)); by redefining the term "deductible earnings" for
claims filed on or after July 1, 2002, to mean "all money in excess of $50.00 each week
earned by a claimant for services performed," § 3, 2002 Ga. Laws at 1121 (amending
O.C.G.A. § 34-8-30 (1998)); by changing provisions relating to the "standard rate" of
employer contributions, § 4,2002 Ga. Laws at 1121 (amending O.C.G.A. § 34-8-155 (1998));
and by suspending the rate surcharge under O.C.G.A. § 34-8-156 for the period of January
1, 2003, through December 31, 2003, § 5, 2002 Ga. Laws at 1121-22 (amending O.C.G.A.
§ 34-8-156 (1998)). Similarly, a 2003 enactment, effective May 30, 2003, extends the
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tion criteria for individuals employed by "professional employer
organizations." 9 Specifically, the legislature amended the Code so that
individuals employed by professional employer organizations will be
presumed to have voluntarily left employment without good cause if they
do not contact the professional employer organizations for reassignment
upon the completion of an assignment. ° With this change, employees
of professional employer organizations will now be disqualified on the
same basis as individuals employed by a "temporary help contracting
firm.""

III.
A.

WRONGFUL DISCHARGE

Employment at Will

1. Overview. An employment-at-will contract has two notable
characteristics. First, either the employee or employer may terminate
the employment relationship at any time, with or without cause. 2
Second, and a corollary of the first characteristic, upon the termination
of an employment-at-will contract, the employee may not successfully
maintain a wrongful termination claim. 3
While the employment-at-will doctrine is gradually eroding in other
jurisdictions, 4 O.C.G.A. section 34-7-1 provides that employment

suspension of the overall increase in the rate of employer contributions to the Unemployment Trust Fund through December 31, 2004. Ga. S. Bill 167, Reg. Sess. (2003).
9. Ga. S. Bill 167, Reg. Sess. (2003). A professional employer organization is defined
as "an employee leasing company ... that has established a coemployment relationship
with another employer, pays the wages of the employees of the coemployer, reserves a right
of direction and control over the employees of the coemployer, and assumes responsibility
for the withholding and payment of payroll taxes of the coemployer." O.C.G.A. § 34-7-6(a)
(1998 & Supp. 2003). A "professional employer organization" is considered "employers
under this title and are required to comply with [its] provisions." Id. § 34-7-6(d).
10. Ga. S. Bill 167, Reg. Sess (2003).
11. See O.C.G.A. § 34-8-157(c) (1998).
12. See generally WIMBERLY, supra note 3, at 20-21.
13. Id.
14. See Mark A. Fahleson, The Public Policy Exception to Employment at Will-When
Should Courts Defer to the Legislature? 72 NEB. L. REV. 956 (1993); Cortlan H. Maddux,
Employers Beware! The Emerging Use of Promissory Estoppel as an Exception to
Employment at Will, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 197 (1997); Kimberly Anne Huffman, Salt v.

Applied Analytical, Inc.: Clarifyingthe Confusion in North Carolina'sEmployment-at-Will
Doctrine, 70 N.C. L. REV. 2087 (1992); Richard J. Pratt, Unilateral Modification of
Employment Handbooks:FurtherEncroachmentson the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 197 (1990); and Melanie Robin Galberry, Employers Beware: South
Carolina'sPublic Policy Exception to the At-Will Employment Doctrine is Likely to Keep
Expanding, 51 S.C. L. REV. 406 (2000).
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contracts in Georgia are at will, unless the parties implicitly or explicitly
contract otherwise.15 Generally, this section means that in the absence
of a specified length of employment, the relationship is employment at
will.16 Contract provisions specifying permanent employment, employment for life, or employment until retirement1 7 are indefinite, and
therefore, they are employment-at-will contracts.
During the survey period, the court of appeals opinion in Hanne v.
Mississippi Management, Inc."' demonstrated just how strictly the
courts construe the employment-at-will doctrine by holding that a
contract purporting to abrogate the doctrine must specify the term of the
employment relationship-mere inferences will not suffice.' 9 In Hanne
after an employee was terminated from his employment of five months,
he sued for wrongful termination, alleging that a letter agreement
between the parties created a two-year employment contract. Specifically, the employee based his contentions on two provisions of the letter
agreement.20 One provision stated that "[a]fter employment here for
two years, on April 20, 2000, you will receive a $4,000 bonus . . . [but,]
[i]f you leave for any reason before that time, whether it is your choice
or not, you will not be eligible to receive this bonus."2 ' The second
provision stated that if the employee did not remain employed for two
years, he would be required to reimburse
the employer for the moving
22
expenses paid to him upon his hiring.
The court of appeals held that this language was not sufficient to
establish a definite term of employment. 23 The court reasoned that
despite the references to a period of two years in the provisions, the
provisions did not establish a two-year term of employment because they
merely referred to the eligibility of bonuses and the responsibility of the
employee to pay back his moving costs if he did not remain with the
company for two years. 24 Despite the inferences otherwise, neither
provision contained a definite term of employment. 25
The court
reiterated that "'[a]n employment contract containing no definite term
of employment is terminable at the will of either party, and will not

15.

O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1 (1998).

16.
17.

See generally WIMBERLY, supra note 3, at 20-21.
WIMBERLY, supra note 3, at 20.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

255 Ga. App. 143, 564 S.E.2d 557 (2002).
Id. at 143-44, 564 S.E.2d at 557-58.
Id.
Id., 564 S.E.2d at 557.
Id. at 144, 564 S.E.2d at 557.
Id., 564 S.E.2d at 558.
Id., 564 S.E.2d at 557.
Id.
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support a cause of action against the employer for wrongful termination."'26 Mere inferences to the contrary will not abrogate this doctrine. 27 Accordingly, the court rejected the employee's argument and
upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the breach of
employment contract claim.
2. Terms of an At-Will Contract. In an employment-at-will
contract, the employee agrees to work for the reasonable salary he is
paid. If, for example, the employee does not like the salary, or the
employer feels that the employee is not worth his agreed upon salary,
either party is free to terminate the employment relationship.29
However, Rodriguez v.Vision Correction Group, Inc. ° illustrates that,
in addition to refusing to provide relief to terminated employees, the
courts will not provide relief to at-will employees whose compensation
terms are altered after the commencement of employment.3 '
In Rodriguez the court held that an alleged oral promise to a chief
financial officer to pay an employee a specified amount was a term of an
employment-at-will contract that could not be enforced. 32 The employee, Rodriguez, was promised by the employer certain stock options, along
with her regular salary. The details of this stock option plan were
purely speculative, and this promise was never integrated into a writing.
Rodriguez was terminated before the stock option plan was exercised,
and the employer refused to honor the promise. Agreeing that there was
no valid contract, Rodriguez sued under unjust enrichment, claiming
that the stock options (along with her salary) represented her market
value and that the employer's attempt to keep this payment constituted
unjust enrichment.33
The court rejected this argument, holding that a plaintiff may not
circumvent the employment-at-will doctrine under unjust enrichment.3 4
The court stated that to recover under unjust enrichment, plaintiff had
the burden to demonstrate that "she was not already reasonably

26.
10, 10,
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id., 564 S.E.2d at 558 (quoting Burton v. John Thurmond Constr. Co., 201 Ga. App.
410 S.E.2d 137, 138 (1991)).
See id. at 143-44, 564 S.E.2d at 557-58.
Id. at 144, 564 S.E.2d at 558.
See generally WIMBERLY, supra note 3, at 20-21.
260 Ga. App. 478, 580 S.E.2d 266 (2003).
Id. at 478, 580 S.E.2d at 266.
Id. at 479, 580 S.E.2d at 268.
Id., 580 S.E.2d at 267-68.
Id., 580 S.E.2d at 268.
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compensated for her services."35 Further, the court noted the lack of
any "cases where an employee was allowed to recover damages in
quantum meruit or unjust enrichment after she was already paid the
salary she negotiated."3 6 Here, the court reasoned that Rodriguez had
admitted that her salary was reasonable.3 7 Further, the court reasoned
that she conceded that her salary was reasonable by continuing to work
for the employer for more than four years.3 8 Accordingly, the court
affirmed the lower court's summary judgment in favor of the employ39
er.

3. Exceptions to Employment at Will. The statute creating the
employment-at-will doctrine also states the most significant exception to
the doctrine-unless the parties implicitly or explicitly contract
otherwise.4 ° Additionally, the Code contains other exceptions to the
doctrine. For example, an employer cannot discharge an employee
simply because his earnings are subject to one garnishment,4 1 and
employers cannot discharge employees who are absent from work due to
compulsory attendance at a judicial proceeding.
However, as Balmer v. Elan Corp.4 3 illustrates, the court of appeals
refused to allow judicially created public policy exceptions to the
doctrine. 44 In Balmer the employer allegedly promised plaintiff and
other employees that they would not be discharged for cooperating with
the Food and Drug Administration's inspection of the employer's
facilities.
After the inspection, the employer disagreed with the
employees' handling of the inspection and fired them. The employees
then sued for wrongful termination. At trial the court dismissed the
wrongful termination claims, and the employees appealed, arguing that
the promise not to fire abrogated the doctrine of employment at will. 45
Specifically, the employees argued that the court should view "freedom
of contract" as a policy exception to the doctrine.4 6

35. Id. (citing Nelson & Hill, P.A. v. Wood, 245 Ga. App. 60, 64, 537 S.E.2d 670, 675
(2000); Jackson v. Ford, 252 Ga. App. 304, 308, 555 S.E.2d 143, 148 (2001)).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 480, 580 S.E.2d at 268 (quoting Walker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 152 Ga. App.
526, 527, 263 S.E.2d 266, 267 (1979)).
39. Id.
40. O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1.
41. O.C.G.A. § 18-4-7 (1999).
42. O.C.G.A. § 34-1-3 (1998).
43. 261 Ga. App. 543, 583 S.E.2d 131 (2003).
44. Id. at 544, 583 S.E.2d at 133.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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The court of appeals rejected the employees' argument, stating that
"[alithough there can be public policy exceptions to the doctrine,
judicially created exceptions are not favored, and Georgia courts thus
generally defer to the legislature to create them."4 7 Reasoning that the
legislature had not created any "freedom to contract" public policy
exception-for example, when an employer promises not to fire an
employee-the court held that an action for wrongful discharge would
not lie on such basis.48 Accordingly, the court upheld the trial court's
dismissal of the wrongful discharge claim.49
4.
Sovereign Immunity. The Georgia Constitution waives
sovereign immunity with respect to breach of contract actions against
the state government.5 ° However, in Moon v. Terrell County,5 the
court held that this waiver does not apply in a case in which an
employee sues the government under an employment-at-will contract.52
In Moon a discharged employee sued Terrell County for back pay. The
trial court dismissed the claim and Moon appealed.53
The court of appeals held that "as an at-will employee, Moon could not
assert a claim for back pay under Georgia law." 4 The court noted that
the Georgia Constitution waives sovereign immunity for "'any action ex
contractu for the breach of any written contract.' 55 However, the court
previously held that this provision did not include employees-at-will
without a written contract. 6 Accordingly, the employee could not
maintain an action for back pay against the county.57
B.

Breach of Employment Contract (other than at-will contracts)

1. Formulation of Employment Contracts. To form a valid
employment contract, basic rules of contract law apply: Offer, acceptance, and consideration. Further, an employment contract must contain

47. Id. (citing Reilly v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 272 Ga. 279, 279-80, 528 S.E.2d 238,
239-40 (2000)).
48. Id. at 544-45, 583 S.E.2d at 133 (citing Evans v. Bibb Co., 178 Ga. App. 139, 139-40,
342 S.E.2d 484, 485-86 (1986)).
49. Id. at 545, 583 S.E.2d at 133-34.

50.

GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9(c).

51.

260 Ga. App. 433, 579 S.E.2d 845 (2003).

52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

56.
57.

Id.
Id.

434-35, 579 S.E.2d at 847.
433-34, 579 S.E.2d at 846-47.
434, 579 S.E.2d at 847.
435, 579 S.E.2d at 847 (quoting Waters v. Glynn County, 237 Ga. App. 438,
439, 514 S.E.2d 680, 682 (2003) (citing GA. CONST. art. 1, § 2, para. 9(c))).
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a designation of the employee's place of employment, period of employment (if not specified, then at-will"8 ), the nature of services to be
rendered, and the amount or type of compensation. The terms of an
employment contract must be sufficiently definite to be enforceable, and
this is a question of law for the judge. 9
6°
In Quadron Software International Corp. v. Plotseneder,
the court
of appeals considered how to determine whether a contract's terms are
sufficiently certain to be enforceable.6 1 In Plotseneder the employer,
Fischer, purchased Blue Rainbow Software International ("Blue
Rainbow") and formed Quadron Software International Corporation
("Quadron") to market the product. Fischer then hired plaintiff,
Plotseneder, for business development and marketing. 62 The Sales
Agreement between the parties contained the following provisions:
1. You agree with the proposal I submitted to you and Mark Merenda
in April (not dated, see attachment) with the understanding that the
projected expenses have not been approved yet. Independent of the
actual numbers submitted, you agree with the approach to take the
same percentage of the overall expenses of Quadron (here taken from
Randall King's business plan) for determining the appropriate numbers
for European Sales and other territories outside of North America ....
2. I will receive a commission of 10% for all revenues from direct sales
(license and maintenance fees) and 5% as an override for sales closed
by a third party (for example distributor, agent or other employee).
This includes single licenses as well as volume sales ....

My current

base compensation plan as offered and approved by Randall King will
remain unchanged.-Should Fischer [International] and Quadron agree
to sell each other's products, revenues for Fischer [International]
products will be compensated under the same 10% and 5% scheme. 3.
My sales territory encompasses all countries except the USA, Canada,
and Mexico ....

5. Initially, this agreement shall commence on June

1, 1994, for an initial period of 19 months.'
Another agreement executed between the parties, a "Development
Agreement," obligated plaintiff to fix flaws in two software products
owned by Quadron and Fischer International, in exchange for fifty
percent of the net revenues from the sales proceeds. This agreement

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See supra section III(A)(1).
See generally WIMBERLY, supra note 3, at 6-7.
256 Ga. App. 284, 568 S.E.2d 178 (2002).
Id. at 284-91, 568 S.E.2d at 178-83.
Id. at 285, 568 S.E.2d at 180.
Id. at 285-86, 568 S.E.2d at 180.
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specified a term of three years, regardless of plaintiff's employment with
Quadron.'
After the parties began employment under the contract, the parties'
relationship deteriorated, and Quadron terminated plaintiff in November
1994. Plaintiff then filed a lawsuit against Quadron and Fischer
International on several claims, including a breach of contract action in
which plaintiff contended that Quadron owed him $6030 for breach of
the Sales Agreement. Plaintiff also sought specific performance of the
Development Agreement, or $500,000 in the alternative. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the employer on all claims except
those arising from the breach of the Sales Agreement and the Development Agreement, and defendants appealed.65
On appeal defendants argued that the Sales Agreement was too
ambiguous to be enforceable. 6' However, the court disagreed.67 The
court stated:
To be enforceable, a contract's language must be "sufficiently plain and
explicit to convey what the parties agreed upon ....[Ilt is unnecessary
that a contract state definitively and specifically all facts in detail to
which the parties may be agreeing, but as to such matters, it will be
sufficiently definite and certain if it contains matters which will enable
the courts, under proper rules of construction, to ascertain the terms
and conditions on which the parties intended to bind themselves."'
Additionally, "[t]he law does not favor 'the destruction of contracts on the
ground of uncertainty if it is possible in the light of the circumstances
under which the contract was made to determine the reasonable
intention[s] of the parties.'"69
Applying these rules of construction, the court held that the Sales
Agreement was sufficiently certain to be enforceable." ° First, defendants argued that the first numbered paragraph was too vague because
it referenced a collateral document (the "proposal"), which outlined
expenses."
The court stated, however, that this proposal was not

64. Id. at 286, 586 S.E.2d at 180.
65.
66.

Id. at 284-87, 568 S.E.2d at 179-81.
Id. at 287, 568 S.E.2d at 181.

67.

Id.

68. Id. (quoting Pacrim Assocs. v. Turner Home Entm't, Inc., 235 Ga. App. 761, 764,
510 S.E.2d 52, 55 (1998) (internal citations omitted)).
69. Id. (quoting Gram Corp. v. Wilkinson, 210 Ga. App. 680, 681, 437 S.E.2d 341, 342

(1993) (internal citations omitted)).
70.

Id.

71.

Id. at 288, 568 S.E.2d at 181.
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alleged to be an essential term.72 Further, testimony established that
Quadron had paid plaintiff commissions under the agreement, indicating
that the parties, by their actions, did not consider the proposal to be
essential in determining when or how much Quadron was required to
73
pay.
Second, defendants argued that the Sales Agreement was unenforceable because it did not identify the type of products that would generate
the specified commissions.74
The court reasoned that the Sales
Agreement did not purport to restrict the
scope of such products, and
75
therefore, no essential term was lacking.
Finally, the court rejected defendants' argument that the Sales
Agreement was unenforceable because it left terms to be negotiated in
the future. 71 Specifically, defendants pointed to a crossed-out provision
stating that the commissions would also apply to products to be
determined by Fischer International.7 7
The court reasoned that
evidence of the parties' conduct subsequent to the agreement demonstrated the terms of the agreement.78 Accordingly, the court ruled that
the agreement was sufficiently certain to be enforceable.7 9
2. Statute of Frauds. Under Georgia's statute of frauds, "[a]ny
agreement that is not to be performed within one year from the making
thereof " must be in writing and signed by the party to be charged.8 '
In Parker v. Crider Poultry, Inc.,2 the supreme court held that a
contract containing no definite term of employment did not require
compliance with the statute of frauds, despite an employee's completion
of over one year under the contract after the dispute arose. 3 Parker
entered into a contract with Crider Poultry for an unspecified term of
employment. A letter agreement sent by Crider Poultry to Parker
confirmed the salary, incentive bonus, job title, starting date, and a
required three-month notice provision upon termination of the employment by either party. After holding the position as CEO for a period of

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id., 568 S.E.2d at 181-82.
Id., 568 S.E.2d at 182.
Id. at 288-89, 568 S.E.2d at 182.
Id. at 289, 568 S.E.2d at 182.
Id.
Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30(5) (1998 & Supp. 2002).
Id. § 13-5-30.
275 Ga. 361, 565 S.E.2d 797 (2002), reconsid. denied (July 26, 2002).
Id. at 362, 565 S.E.2d at 799.
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time, Parker decided to leave the company and tendered his three-month
notice. Thereafter, the company filed suit against Parker for breach of
contract and breach of fiduciary duty. The employer sought to compel
Parker to return bonuses that had been advanced to him. Parker
counterclaimed, alleging that the company violated the three-month
notice provision in the letter agreement, which required the company to
allow him to continue to work through the three-month period or give
him three months salary. The trial court granted partial summary
judgment to Crider on the counterclaim, holding that the letter
agreement violated the statute of frauds because it was not signed by
the party to be charged (Crider). Parker appealed to the court of
appeals, which affirmed based upon the same reasoning. Parker then
appealed to the supreme court.8 4
On appeal the supreme court held that the trial court and court of
appeals erred in finding that the contract violated the statute of
frauds.8 5 "A contract of employment of indefinite duration does not fall
within the Statute of Frauds"86 because "at its inception, ... [it] is an
agreement capable of being performed within one year, and the
possibility of performance of the contract within one year is sufficient to
remove it from the Statute of Frauds."8 7 The trial court and court of
appeals had determined that because the parties were actually under the
contract for more than one year at the time the lawsuit was filed, the
agreement had to comply with the statute. 8 The supreme court
rejected this argument, reasoning that the argument was based on
misplaced reliance of an earlier distinguishable case, which held that a
contract had to be in writing because the contracts sought to be enforced
were actually contemplated not to be performed within one year of their
making.8 9 The court reversed the trial court's grant of partial summary
judgment and remanded the case to resolve the factual issues.9 °
3. Dismissals "With Cause." Under a contractual agreement
between an employer and an employee that requires "cause" for
dismissal, an employer who fires an employee without cause can be

84. Id. at 361-62, 565 S.E.2d at 798.
85. Id. at 362, 565 S.E.2d at 799.
86. Id., 565 S.E.2d at 798 (citing Wood v. Dan P. Holl & Co., 169 Ga. App. 839, 841,315
S.E.2d 51, 53 (1984)).
87. Id., 565 S.E.2d at 798-99 (citing Bibb Distrib. Co. v. Stewart, 238 Ga. App. 650,654,
519 S.E.2d 455, 458-59 (1999)).
88. Id.
89. Id. See Gatins v. NCR Corp., 180 Ga. App. 595, 349 S.E.2d 818 (1986).
90. 275 Ga. at 363, 565 S.E.2d at 799.
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liable for breach of contract and for the resulting damages. 9' In Salhab
v. Tift Heart Center, P C.,92 the court of appeals held that whether an
employee's alleged acts of unprofessional conduct or conduct detrimental
to the employer constituted cause for discharge was an issue of fact for
a jury to determine because conflicting testimony in the record established a fact issue concerning credibility. 3 In Salhab the parties
entered into an employment contract that allowed plaintiff's termination
only for cause. After seven months of employment, the employer
exercised its right under the contract to discharge plaintiff. Plaintiff
sued, arguing that the employer did not have cause for the dismissal,
and the trial court granted summary judgment in the employer's
favor.9 4
The employee appealed the trial court's finding that there were no
genuine issues of material fact to be resolved.95 The court of appeals
agreed with the employee. 96 The court stated that this case was
distinct from other cases allowing summary judgment in the employer's
favor in which undisputed testimony demonstrated that the employee's
performance was unsatisfactory.9 7 In this case, the court noted that the
record contained conflicting testimony on whether the employee had
acted unprofessionally or had engaged in conduct which discredited or
damaged the employer's reputation.98 Therefore, this case concerned
issues of credibility, and "summary judgment [is] precluded where [a]
question of credibility arises as to a material issue."9 9 Accordingly, the
court reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for the jury
to resolve the credibility issues. i °
C.

Forfeiture Clauses
Generally, the law of contracts disfavors forfeitures.' 0 ' However, the

91. See Savannah Coll. of Art & Design, Inc. v. Nulph, 265 Ga. 662, 460 S.E.2d 792
(1995).
92. 260 Ga. App. 799, 581 S.E.2d 363 (2003).
93. Id. at 802, 581 S.E.2d at 365.
94. Id. at 799, 581 S.E.2d at 363-64.
95. Id., 581 S.E.2d at 364.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 800, 581 S.E.2d at 364 (citing Odem v. Pace Acad., 235 Ga. App. 648, 654,
510 S.E.2d 326, 330-31 (1998)).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 802, 581 S.E.2d at 365 (citing Cherokee County Hosp. Auth. v. Beaver, 179
Ga. App. 200, 205, 345 S.E.2d 904, 908 (1986)).
100. Id.
101. See Russell v. KDA, Inc., 206 Ga. App. 397, 399, 425 S.E.2d 406, 408 (1992)
("'[Wihere a contract in unmistakable terms provides for a forfeiture and is otherwise free
from legal infirmity, neither a court of law nor a court of equity will relieve against the
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court of appeals recently reiterated that such clauses are not per se
unlawful and may be enforced in some circumstances. 10 2 In Fernandes
v. Manugistics Atlanta, Inc.,' 1 3 the court of appeals upheld a forfeiture
provision in an employment contract that denied an employee sales
commissions that were not both earned and payable before the terminaA sales employee, Fernandes, terminated
tion of his employment.'
his employment with Manugistics in 2000 and demanded his commission
bonuses from accounts he sold up to the date of his termination.
Fernandes's employment contract, however, dictated that sales
commissions must be both "earned" and "payable"-meaning the account
was both sold and collected upon-before termination of Fernandes's
employment for the commissions to be payable. Accordingly, the
employer refused to pay the commissions for accounts that had not been
collected upon as of the date Fernandes left the company.1" 5
The court of appeals reaffirmed the principle that while the law
generally disfavors forfeiture clauses, such clauses are not categorically
unlawful.1" 6 The court reasoned, "'[Wihere a contract in unmistakable
terms provides for a forfeiture and is otherwise free from legal infirmity,
neither a court of law nor a court of equity will relieve against the
forfeiture. '" 10 7 Because the contract unambiguously limited the payments of sales commissions to those that were earned and payable
through the last day of employment, the forfeiture clause was valid.'0 8
The court rejected the employee's argument that a prior court's decision
in Rodriguez v. Miranda °9 disallowed forfeiture provisions."0 Rodriguez merely enunciated a principle of law on forfeiture that an ambiguous provision will be construed against a drafter, not that forfeiture
Accordingly, the court upheld the
provisions are unenforceable."'
2
the
employer."
favor
of
clause and ruled in

forfeiture.'" Id. (quoting Equitable Loan & Sec. Co. v. Waring, 117 Ga. 599, 599, 44 S.E.
320, 320 (1903), superceded by statute as stated in Williams v. Studstill, 251 Ga. 466, 306
S.E.2d 633 (1983)).
102. See Fernandes v. Manugistics Atlanta, Inc., 261 Ga. App. 429,434,582 S.E.2d 499,
503 (2003).
103. 261 Ga. App. 429, 582 S.E.2d 499 (2003), reconsid. denied (Oct. 6, 2003).
104. Id. at 434, 582 S.E.2d at 503.
105. Id. at 429-34, 582 S.E.2d at 499-504.
106. Id. at 434, 582 S.E.2d at 503.
107. Id. (quotingEquitable Loan & Co., 117 Ga. at 599, 44 S.E. at 320).
108. Id.
109. 234 Ga. App. 779, 507 S.E.2d 789 (1998).
110. 261 Ga. App. at 434, 582 S.E.2d at 503.
111. Id., 582 S.E.2d at 503-04 (citing Rodriguez, 234 Ga. App. 779, 507 S.E.2d 789).
112. Id., 582 S.E.2d at 503.
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MISCELLANEOUS EMPLOYMENT TORTS

Negligent Hiring or Retention

Under O.C.G.A. section 34-7-20, "[tlhe employer is bound to exercise
ordinary care in the selection of employees and not to retain them after
knowledge of incompetency."1 ' Courts have held that this statute
imposes a duty on the employer to "warn other employees of dangers
incident to employment that 'the employer knows or ought to know but
which are unknown to the employee.'"'1 4 For an employee to sustain
an action for negligent hiring and retention, a plaintiff "must show that
'the employer knew or should have known of the employee's propensity
to engage in the conduct which caused the plaintiff's injury." 1

5

This

propensity "'must consist of evidence substantially related to the injurycausing conduct."'"
Generally, the determination of whether an
employer used ordinary care in hiring an employee is a jury issue." 7
B.

Tortious Interference with Employment Contract

Tortious interference with employment contract claims are brought
An action for
pursuant to O.C.G.A. sections 51-9-1 and 51-12-30.1,
tortious interference lies when an employee-employer contract has been
intentionally interfered with by a third party to the contract."9 The
court of appeals decided three notable tortious interference cases in the
survey period: Two cases in the context of an at-will employment
contract and one case addressing the requirement that the person
interfering with the contract be a third party. 2 °

113. O.C.G.A. § 34-7-20 (1998).
114. Tecumseh Prods. Co. v. Rigdon, 250 Ga. App. 739, 740, 552 S.E.2d 910, 912 (2001)
(quoting O.C.G.A. § 34-7-20 (1998)).
115. Id. (quoting Harper v. City of E. Point, 237 Ga. App. 375,376,515 S.E.2d 623,625
(1999)).
116. Id. at 741, 552 S.E.2d at 912 (quotingHarper,237 Ga.App. at 376, 515 S.E.2d at
625).
117. Id. (citing Sparlin Chiropractic Clinic v. TOPS Pers. Servs., 193 Ga. App. 181,387
S.E.2d 411 (1989)).
118. O.C.G.A. §§ 51-9-1, 51-12-30 (2000).
119. See generally WIhBERLY, supra note 3, at 356-57.
120. Gunnells v. Marshburn, 259 Ga. App. 657, 578 S.E.2d 273 (2003); Automated
Solutions Enters., Inc. v. Clearview Software, Inc., 255 Ga. App. 884, 567 S.E.2d 335
(2002); and Nicholson v. Windham, 257 Ga. App. 429, 571 S.E.2d 466 (2002), cert. denied
(Nov. 25, 2002).
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First, in Gunnells v. Marshburn,12 ' the court of appeals held that an
employee could not maintain a tortious interference action based on an
employment-at-will contract absent a showing that the defendant
committed an independently wrongful act in interfering with the
contract.'2 2 In Gunnells the employee, Patricia Gunnells, sued the
Banks-Jackson-Commerce Hospital Authority ("BJC") for slander and
wrongful termination of employment. Gunnells also sued Dr. Robert
Marshburn for slander and wrongful interference with employment. Dr.
Marshburn allegedly learned from a telephone call from a pharmacist
that Gunnells attempted to illegally obtain prescriptions. Dr. Marshburn reported the incident and an investigation ensued, which subsequently resulted in Gunnells's termination for drug abuse. Gunnells
sued, and the trial court dismissed the tortious interference with
employment
contract claim against Dr. Marshburn.
Gunnells ap123
pealed.
The court of appeals addressed the requirements for a claim of tortious
interference with an at-will employment contract. 24 The court stated:
"[Iln an action for tortious interference with an employment relationship that is terminable at will, the plaintiff must show that a party
with no authority to discharge the employee, being activated by an
unlawful scheme or purpose to injure and damage him, maliciously and
unlawfully persuades the employer to breach the contract with the
employee. Malice plus injury to business of itself does not, however,
constitute the tort of wrongful interference with business. Rather, an
independent wrongful act is required as well as an injury." 2'
Applying this rule, the court reasoned that despite Gunnells's showing
that Marshburn bore her ill will, she submitted no evidence that
Marshburn committed an independent wrongful act.'2 6 Rather, Dr.
Marshburn truthfully reported the pharmacist's allegation that Gunnells
attempted to illegally obtain pharmaceuticals.' 27
Accordingly, the
court upheld the trial court's summary
judgment
in
favor
of Marshburn
12
on the tortious interference claim.

121. 259 Ga. App. 657, 578 S.E.2d 273 (2003).
122. Id. at 659-60, 578 S.E.2d at 275.
123. Id. at 657-58, 578 S.E.2d at 274.
124. Id. at 659-60, 578 S.E.2d at 275.
125. Id. (quoting Rose v. Zurowski, 236 Ga. App. 157, 158, 511 S.E.2d 265, 266-67
(1999) (internal citations omitted)).
126. Id. at 660, 578 S.E.2d at 275.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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Similarly, in Automated Solutions Enterprises, Inc. v. Clearview
Software, Inc.,' 29 the court of appeals addressed the same issue and
expanded upon what types of wrongful acts could satisfy plaintiff's
showing of interference with an employment-at-will contract. Automated
Solutions Enterprises, Inc. ("ASE") sued James Stritzinger, an officer of
Solomon Software and another related company, for allegedly interfering
with its at-will employment contract with an employee, Besch. Besch
allegedly worked as a software developer for ASE for six and one-half
years when he expressed his desire to Stritzinger to leave ASE.
Stritzinger responded that there may have been an opening for a
position at a software subsidiary of Solomon Software ("STC"). Soon
thereafter, Stritzinger and Besch agreed upon the terms of the new
employment, and Besch quit his employment with ASE. Stritzinger
asked Besch to conceal from ASE the news that he would be leaving the
company because Stritzinger was then in negotiations with ASE to
merge ASE and STC. The merger never occurred. After Besch left ASE,
ASE sued Stritzinger, STC, and Solomon for intentional interference
with Besch's employment contract. The trial court subsequently entered
summary judgment in favor of defendants on all counts, and ASE
appealed.130
Among ASE's contentions was that a genuine issue of material fact
131
existed regarding the interference with employment contract claim.
As stated in Gunnells, a plaintiff alleging interference with an at-will
employment contract must show that the defendant committed some
independent wrongful act.1 3 1 "'Such wrongful means generally involve
predatory tactics such as ...fraud or misrepresentation ....,33 ASE
asserted that the "wrongful means" requirement was satisfied upon its
showing that Stritzinger enlisted Besch to conceal, for purposes of the
The court
merger, the news of Besch's hiring away from ASE.'
rejected this argument, reasoning that despite such motives, the merger
never occurred. 135 Without some financial injury, there could be no
misrepresentation or fraud. 1 36 Accordingly, the court ruled that ASE
had not satisfied its burden to demonstrate an independent wrongful act

129. 255 Ga. App. 884, 567 S.E.2d 335 (2002).
130. Id. at 884-86, 567 S.E.2d at 336-37.
131. Id. at 884-85, 567 S.E.2d at 336.
132. 259 Ga. App. at 660, 578 S.E.2d at 275.
133. Automated Solutions, 255 Ga. App. at 889, 567 S.E.2d at 339 (quoting Am. Bldgs.
Co. v. Pascoe Bldg. Sys., Inc., 260 Ga. 346, 349, 392 S.E.2d 860, 863 (1990) (internal
citations omitted)).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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and affirmed
the trial court's summary judgment in favor of defen37
dants.
In the next survey case, Nicholson v. Windham,13 the court of
appeals addressed the requirement that a defendant must be a third
party to the contract and held that while a former temporary worker of
a law firm could not maintain an action against the firm, she could
maintain an action against individual employees of the firm. l1 9 In
Nicholson a temporary employee, Nicholson, was fired from her
employment with a law firm. Allegedly, several individual members
asked her to engage in illegal activities and had her fired when she
refused. She subsequently brought suit for alleged violations of the
Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), tortious
interference with contractual rights, civil conspiracy, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, defamation, libel and slander. The trial
court dismissed the entire complaint, and Nicholson appealed. 14°
On appeal Nicholson claimed that the trial court erred in dismissing
the tortious interference claim against the firm and against individual
members of the firm.'' The court noted that for a plaintiff to prevail
on a tortious interference claim, a plaintiff must:
"establish that the defendant is a 'third party', i.e., a 'stranger' to the
contract with which the defendant allegedly interfered." An intended
third-party beneficiary of a contract, who is legally authorized to
enforce the contract, "cannot be held liable for tortious interference
since he is not a stranger to the contract." Furthermore, "[tihe
exclusion of third-party beneficiaries ... has been expanded to cover
those who benefit from the contract of others, without regard to
whether the beneficiary was
142 intended by the contracting parties to be
a third-party beneficiary."
The court reasoned that the law firm clearly was a third-party
beneficiary and therefore could not be held liable for tortious interference.4 3 The court rejected the individuals' arguments that they too
could not be held liable because "'in Georgia, co-employees stand in the
place of the employer for the purposes of determining whether one is a

137. Id. at 889-90, 567 S.E.2d at 339.
138. 257 Ga. App. 429, 571 S.E.2d 466 (2002), cert. denied (Ga. Nov. 25, 2002) (No.
A02A0948).
139. Id. at 432, 571 S.E.2d at 469.
140. Id. at 429-30, 571 S.E.2d at 468.
141. Id. at 431, 571 S.E.2d at 469.
142. Id. at 432,571 S.E.2d at 469 (quoting Atlanta Mkt. Ctr. Mgmt. Co. v. McLane, 269
Ga. 604, 608-09, 503 S.E.2d 278, 282-83 (1998)).
143. Id.
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stranger to a contract.'" 1"
The court agreed that "co-employees
engaged in conduct 'within the scope of their authority' cannot then be
held liable for such conduct under ... a tortious interference claim."' 45
The court reasoned that a co-worker who does not have the authority to
discharge an aggrieved employee does not enjoy this privilege. 146 The
court held that a fact issue remained as to whether it was within the
individual co-workers' scope of authority to solicit plaintiff to engage in
147
criminal activity and cause her to be terminated when she refused.
Accordingly, the court reversed the lower court's grant of summary
judgment in4 favor of the individual defendants on the tortious interference claim.
V.

RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR

Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be held
vicariously liable for negligent or intentional torts of employees
committed within the scope of the employer's business.' 49 To hold an
employer-defendant vicariously liable for torts of an employee, "first, the
[employee] must be in furtherance of the master's business; and, second,
he must be acting within the scope of his [employer's] business." 5 °
Vicarious liability under respondeat superior does not apply to the acts
of independent contractors. 5 '
In Piedmont Hospital, Inc. v. Palladino,5 2 the supreme court held
that a hospital employee's manipulation of a patient's genitals was not
conduct in furtherance of the hospital's business because the acts were
purely personal. 5 3 Plaintiff, Albert Palladino, underwent an angioplasty at Piedmont Hospital. A hospital employee, Patterson, was
responsible for Palladino's post-surgical treatment, including checking
the groin area for bleeding or complications. This duty required
Patterson to move Palladino's testicles if necessary to check the groin
area where the catheter had been inserted. Palladino alleged that upon

144.

145.
(1989)).
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.

Id. (quoting Lane v. K-Mart Corp., 190 Ga. App. 113, 114, 378 S.E.2d 136, 137
Id., 571 S.E.2d at 470.
Id. at 432-33, 571 S.E.2d at 470.
Id. at 433, 571 S.E.2d at 470.
CHARLES R.
Id.

ADAMs, III, GEORGIA

LAW OF ToRTs

§

7-2 (2002).

151. Id.
152. 276 Ga. 612, 580 S.E.2d 215 (2003), reconsid. denied (Ga. June 2, 2003) (No.
S02Ga1036).
153. Id. at 616, 580 S.E.2d at 218.
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his awakening from surgery, he discovered Patterson rubbing his penis
with both hands, with his mouth nearby. 5
The court of appeals held that Patterson's acts were in furtherance of
the hospital's business because he was authorized to inspect the incision
by moving plaintiff's testicles, and his improper act "was 'not so far
removed from his accepted duties to preclude liability for his employer.'' 15 5 The supreme court rejected this argument, citing precedent
holding that when an employee abandons his authorized duties to
pursue his own personal, morally offensive agenda, the conduct ceases
to be within the scope of the employee's employment or connected to the
employer's business.' 56 Applying this rule to Patterson's conduct, the
court reasoned that during his authorized touching of Palladino's groin
area for the purposes of medical care, he was within the scope of his
employment and in furtherance of the hospital's business."' However,
at the moment Patterson began manipulating Palladino's genitals, he
abandoned the hospital's interests and favored his own personal
interests.1 58 Moreover, the court reasoned that "simply because a
tortious act occurs during the time of employment is not dispositive on
the issue of whether an employee was acting within the scope of his
employment when the tort was committed."'5 9 The court concluded
that Patterson's actions went beyond the scope of his employment and
were unconnected to the hospital's business. 6 ° The court reversed the
lower court on this issue.'6 '
The next case in the survey period, Spencer v. Gary HowardEnterprises, Inc., 6 2 discussed the rebuttable presumption that an employee is
in the scope of the employer's business while operating a company

154. Id. at 613, 580 S.E.2d at 216.
155. Id. at 616, 580 S.E.2d at 218 (quoting Palladino v. Piedmont Hosp., Inc., 254 Ga.
App. 102, 104, 561 S.E.2d 235, 238 (2002)).
156. Id. (citing Lucas v. Hosp. Auth. of Dougherty County, 193 Ga. App. 595, 596, 388
S.E.2d 871, 873 (1989); Alpharetta First United Methodist Church v. Stewart, 221 Ga. App.
748, 752, 472 S.E.2d 532, 536 (1996); B.C.B. Co. v. Troutman, 200 Ga. App. 671, 672, 409
S.E.2d 218, 219 (1991); Favors v. Alco Mfg., Co., 186 Ga. App. 480, 482-83, 367 S.E.2d 328,
331 (1998); and Big Brother/Big Sister of Metro Atlanta, Inc. v. Terrell, 183 Ga. App. 496,
498, 359 S.E.2d 241, 243 (1987)).
157. Id. at 614, 580 S.E.2d at 217.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 615-16, 580 S.E.2d at 218 (citing Mountain v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 205 Ga.
App. 119, 120, 421 S.E.2d 284, 285 (1992); S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Sharara, 167 Ga. App.
665, 667, 307 S.E.2d 129, 131 (1983)).
160. Id. at 616, 580 S.E.2d at 219.
161. Id. at 617, 580 S.E.2d at 219.
162. 256 Ga. App. 599, 568 S.E.2d 763 (2002), reconsid. denied (July 19, 2002), cert.
denied (Oct. 28, 2002).
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vehicle."
In Spencer the court of appeals held that the employer
successfully rebutted this presumption by demonstrating that the
employee was operating the vehicle without permission.'64
The
employee, Strickland, used a company truck to pick up and deliver
materials. After finishing his shift on May 28, 1997, Strickland left
work in the truck to take co-workers home. Later that evening, around
9:00 p.m., Strickland was involved in an accident while driving under
the influence of alcohol. The victim sued Gary Howard Enterprises for
Strickland's actions under respondeat superior, and the trial court
dismissed.165
The court of appeals reviewed whether the employer successfully
rebutted the presumption that Strickland was within the scope of
employment of Gary Howard Enterprises. 166
The court stated that
this presumption "can [be] rebut[ted] by clear, positive, and uncontradicted evidence." 67 The court reasoned that this presumption was
rebutted through Howard's affidavit, which demonstrated that at the
time of the accident, Strickland did not have permission to use the truck
and was not performing any company duties. 6 ' Additionally, the court
rejected plaintiff's argument that a question of fact existed regarding
whether Spencer was driving home and still acting within the scope of
employment.169 The court noted that Strickland's workday ended at
4:00 p.m., and the accident occurred at 9:30 p.m. 70 Thus, the court
concluded, based on these facts, no reasonable inference could be drawn
that Strickland was "still using the truck in furtherance of his employment" at the time of the72accident.' 7' The court upheld the trial court's
dismissal of this claim.
In Anderson v. Medical Center, Inc., 73 the court of appeals considered whether a medical center could be vicariously liable for the actions
of obstetricians who were independent contractors. 7 4 Generally, a
master is not liable for the torts committed by an independent contrac-

163. Id. at 600-01, 568 S.E.2d at 766.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 599-600, 568 S.E.2d at 765-66.
166. Id. at 600-01, 568 S.E.2d at 766.
167. Id. at 600, 568 S.E.2d at 766 (citing Collins v. Everidge, 161 Ga. App. 708, 708,
289 S.E.2d 804, 805 (1982)).
168. Id. at 600-01, 568 S.E.2d at 766.
169. Id. at 601, 568 S.E.2d at 766.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 602, 568 S.E.2d at 766.
173. 260 Ga. App. 549, 580 S.E.2d 633 (2003).
174. Id. at 550-51, 580 S.E.2d at 635.
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tor.'75 In Anderson, though, Anderson sued the Medical Center ("the
Center") claiming that the Center was vicariously liable for the treating
obstetrician's negligence under the doctrine of apparent agency, which
essentially provides an exception to the rule against holding a master
liable for the torts of independent contractors.'76
Uncontroverted testimony established that the physicians were in fact
independent contractors because "'the employer ha[d] assumed the right
to control the time, manner, and method of executing the work' "-which
is the test to determine employer versus independent contractor
status.17 7 Plaintiff argued that under the doctrine of apparent agency,
a hospital may be liable for the actions of independent contractors when
"(1) the hospital holds out the doctor as its agent, and (2) the patient's
justifiable reliance on that holding out leads to injury."17 The court
found no evidence supporting a claim that there was any such representation or reliance, and the Center was therefore not liable for the
obstetrician's negligence under respondeat superior. 179 Nevertheless,
Anderson demonstrates that just because a servant is an independent
contractor, liability under respondeat superior is not per se precluded.180
In Page v. CFJProperties,'' the court of appeals held that a department store could not be liable under respondeat superior for the acts of2
an off-duty police officer performing private security for the store.1
In Page the defendants, operators of the "Flying J" convenience store,
hired a police officer to provide private security at their business. While
working in this capacity, the officer allegedly saw plaintiff place a bottle
of shampoo under his arm beneath his shirt. The officer confronted
plaintiff and placed him under arrest. The officer notified the manager
that he had arrested plaintiff and would be accompanying plaintiff to the
sheriff's department to be booked. Plaintiff was later found not guilty
of shoplifting, and he sued the Flying J for malicious arrest and
prosecution. The trial court dismissed, holding that the Flying J did not

175. ADAMS, supra note 149, at § 7-2.
176. 260 Ga. App. at 549-50, 580 S.E.2d at 634-35.
177. Id. at 550, 580 S.E.2d at 635 (quoting Williamson v. Coastal Physician Serv. of the
Southeast, 251 Ga. App. 667, 668, 554 S.E.2d 739, 741 (2001)).
178. Id. at 551, 580 S.E.2d at 635 (citing N. Ga. Med. Ctr. v. Stokes, 238 Ga. App. 60,
517 S.E.2d 93 (1999)).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 549-53, 580 S.E.2d at 634-36.
181. 259 Ga. App. 812, 578 S.E.2d 522 (2003).
182. Id. at 814, 578 S.E.2d at 524.
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exercise enough
control over the officer to be liable under respondeat
18 3
superior.
On appeal plaintiff argued that the case should not have been
dismissed because an issue of fact remained as to whether the officer
acted as an employee or independent contractor of the Flying J.18 4 The
court disagreed.8 5 The court stated that generally employers are not
liable for the acts of independent contractors, but if the employer
"[clontrols the time, manner, and method of executing the work, an
employer-employee relationship exists and liability will attach. In
cases involving off-duty police officers working for private employers,
however, the employer escapes liability if the officer was performing
police duties" 1which
the employer did not direct when the cause of
86
action arose.

In this case, the court found that the testimony established that the
time of work was coordinated through a sergeant at the sheriff's
department.8 7 The officer's manner and method of executing the work
was not directed through the Flying J because no job descriptions were
provided, nor was he told by the Flying J what they expected him to do
while providing private security. 8 8 Rather, he reported to work in the
capacity of his job as a sheriff's deputy, as indicated by his wearing a
department uniform and his county issued police gear (handcuffs, badge,
and weapons).'8 9 On the day in question, he was not instructed or
directed to apprehend plaintiff.9 ° The court ruled that the officer's
conduct in arresting plaintiff was "a discharge of his function as a police
officer," and therefore, the private employer could not be held liable for
the officer's actions.' 9'
VI.
A.

RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

Noncompete Agreements

Agreements that place general restraints on trade and have the effect
of lessening competition and encouraging monopolies are void as against

183. Id. at 812-13, 578 S.E.2d at 523-24.
184. Id. at 813, 578 S.E.2d at 523.
185. Id.
186. Id., 578 S.E.2d at 523-24 (quoting Wilson v. Waffle House, Inc., 235 Ga. App. 539,
539, 510 S.E.2d 105, 106 (1998)).
187. Id., 578 S.E.2d at 524.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 813-14, 578 S.E.2d at 524.
190. Id. at 814, 578 S.E.2d at 524.
191. Id.
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public policy. 19 2 Generally, noncompete agreements are disfavored in

contractual relations because they place restrictions on trade, thereby
thwarting competition. 193 Nonetheless, courts will uphold a noncompete agreement when the agreement merely places a partial
restraint upon trade. 9 4 A noncompetition agreement is valid as a
partial restraint on trade if the agreement (1) is written, (2) has a
specific time, (3) has territorial limitation, and (4) has activity restriction.' 9 Additionally, the agreement must be reasonable and that is a
question of law for the court to decide.' 96 However, depending on the
type of contract, the court will apply different levels of scrutiny to the
reasonableness of the contract. 97 If the agreement is ancillary to an
employment agreement, a stricter standard is applied, and if any
provision of the agreement is considered overbroad or unreasonable, the
entire agreement is invalid. 98 But, if the agreement is pursuant to a
contract for the sale of a business, a less stringent standard allows
broader provisions, and even if one provision is deemed overbroad or
unreasonable, the court may "blue pencil" to rewrite or sever the overlybroad provision. 199
During the survey period, the court of appeals decided two cases
dealing with noncompete agreements in employment relations. First, in
200 the court refused to uphold a
Gale Industries, Inc. v. O'Hearn,
nonsolicitation agreement because a territorial restriction was overly
broad.20 ' The court acted in spite of plaintiff's pleas for the court to
apply the blue-pencil theory, thereby severing or rewriting the unreasonable portions of the agreement. 0 2 Plaintiff argued that the agreement
was ancillary to the sale of a business. Gale concerned two agreements.
In 1997 Gale Industries entered into an asset purchase agreement with
Betty O'Hearn, the sole shareholder of Moultrie Insulation ("Moultrie"),
whereby Gale purchased all assets of Moultrie. On the same day, Gale
entered into an employment agreement (that included a noncompete
provision) with Troy O'Hearn, the manager of Moultrie. The noncompete

192.
193.

See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2 (1982 & Supp. 2003).
WIMBERLY, supra note 3, § 2-11.

194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. 257 Ga. App. 220, 570 S.E.2d 661 (2002), cert. denied (Ga. Nov. 25, 2002) (No.
A02A1300).
201. Id. at 222-23, 570 S.E.2d at 663.
202. Id. at 221-22, 570 S.E.2d at 662.
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provision provided that Troy O'Hearn would not directly or indirectly
engage in a list of restricted activities within a 100 mile radius of
Moultrie's place of business for a period of five years. Essentially, Troy
O'Hearn was required to sign this agreement to remain employed by
Moultrie. Troy O'Hearn subsequently became a part owner of Colquitt
Insulation, which did business within the restricted area and performed
activities that were restricted by the covenant. Gale sued for breach of
the noncompete agreement. 3
The trial court found the agreement unreasonable and granted
summary judgment in favor of O'Hearn. On appeal Gale argued that
because the asset purchase agreement entered into with Betty O'Hearn
referenced the Employment Agreement with Troy O'Hearn, the
employment agreement was ancillary to the sale of the business, and
therefore, the less stringent standard for reviewing the reasonableness
of the noncompete restriction should be used. 2 4 The court agreed that
"'if a contract for the sale of a business and an employment contract are
part of the same transaction they may be construed together to supply
missing elements and blue penciled to make over broad terms valid."'20" The court stated that "contemporaneous agreements entered
into between different parties with the sole stockholder not a party to
the agreement at issue" are not part of the same transaction.0 6 The
court reasoned that because the sale involved Betty O'Hearn and did not
involve or was contemporaneous with the agreement with Troy O'Hearn,
the reasonableness of the noncompete agreement in Troy O'Hearn's
employment contract was subject to the more stringent standard.0 7
Therefore, if one provision was overly broad, then the entire noncompete
agreement would fail.2 °8
Next, the court determined that the agreement was invalid because
the territorial restriction was overly broad.20 9 "'Where the restriction
is broad-for example, not limited to clients the employee served-the
territorial limitation must be specified and closely tied [to customers
2 1
O'Hearn served or] to the area [where he] actually worked.'" 1

203. Id. at 220-21, 570 S.E.2d at 661-62.
204. Id., 570 S.E.2d at 662.
205. Id. at 222, 570 S.E.2d at 663 (quoting Lyle v. Memar, 259 Ga. 209,210, 378 S.E.2d
465, 466 (1989)).
206. Id. (citing Drumheller v. Drumheller Bag & Supply, Inc., 204 Ga. App. 623, 62627, 420 S.E.2d 331, 334 (1992)).
207. Id. at 222-23, 570 S.E.2d at 663.
208. Id. at 223, 570 S.E.2d at 663.
209. Id.
210. Id. (quoting Kuehn v. Selton & Assocs., Inc., 242 Ga. App. 662, 664, 530 S.E.2d
787, 790 (2000)).
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Because the 100-mile radius restriction extended into Florida, where
O'Hearn never worked or performed services, the restriction was
unenforceable.2 ' In addition, because one restriction was unenforceable, applying the stricter standard for noncompete agreements ancillary
to employment contracts, the entire noncompete agreement was
unenforceable. 2
B.

NonsolicitationAgreements
In Pregler v. C&Z, Inc.,213 the court of appeals applied the same
principles enunciated in Gale to declare that one unenforceable provision
in a nonsolicitation agreement rendered the entire nonsolicitation
covenant unenforceable. 4 In Pregler plantiff appealed the trial court's
grant of an interlocutory injunction that enforced a nonsolicitation
agreement between plaintiff and Core Investigators, Inc.2"5 The
agreement stated that plaintiff could not "solicit, divert, appropriate to
or accept on behalf of any Competing Business, or ... attempt to solicit,
divert, appropriate to or accept on behalf of any Competing Business,
any business from any customer or actively sought prospective customer
of the Corporation."" 6
Citing the same rule applicable to noncompete covenants ancillary to
employment agreements-they may be upheld only when they are
strictly limited both in time and geographical effect-the court held that
the nonsolicitation provision was unenforceable because it prevented
plaintiff from accepting business from unsolicited former clients.217
The court reasoned that such a restraint was too restrictive because it
not only prevented solicitation of former clients, but also former clients
who themselves initiated the contact.
Such a restriction was held
"'unreasonable ... because in addition to overprotecting [C&Z's] interest,
it unreasonably impacts on [Pregler] and on the public's ability to choose
the professional services it prefers."'' 2 9 And because the provision was
unreasonable, the court held the entire nonsolicitation agreement to be

211. Id.
212. Id.
213. 259 Ga. App. 149, 575 S.E.2d 915 (2003).
214. Id. at 151, 259 S.E.2d at 916-17.
215. Id. at 149, 575 S.E.2d at 916.
216. Id. at 150, 259 S.E.2d at 916.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. (quoting Dougherty, McKinnon & Luby, P.C. v. Greenwald, Denzik & Davis,
P.C., 213 Ga. App. 891, 894, 447 S.E.2d 94, 96 (1994)).
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invalid because "'Georgia law is clear 22
that
if one of them is unenforce°
able, then they are all unenforceable.'
VII.

CONCLUSION

Although labor and employment issues derived from Georgia law often
are not as complex as their federal counterparts, the issues arising
under state law are becoming progressively more challenging with each
passing year. Adding to the challenge is the growing overlap between
state and federal issues. Regardless of whether a practitioner professes
to specialize in state, federal, administrative, trial, or other matters
pertaining to labor and employment law, it is important to recognize
that any one law or legal proceeding can and does impact other relations
between employer and employee.

220. Id. at 151, 259 S.E.2d at 916-17 (quoting Advance Tech. Consultants v. Roadtrac,
LLC, 250 Ga. App. 317, 320, 551 S.E.2d 735, 737 (2001)).

